CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments
研究CEO薪酬合同与公司采用反收购章程修正案（ATA）之间的关系，发现采用ATA的公司CEO薪酬更高，且差距在采用后扩大，不支持ATA有助于签订有效薪酬合同的假设。
ABSTRACT This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above‐market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts.