私人信息经济中的货币与信用

Currency and Credit in a Private Information Economy

Journal of Political Economy · 1989
被引 107
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

在私人信息、空间分离和有限沟通的环境中,区分了货币类对象和标准记名信用,并分析了帕累托最优规则如何使货币与信用的组合响应个体需求和整体经济状态。

Abstract

In an environment with private information, spatial separation, and limited communication, a currency-like object and more standard named credits can be distinguished. The credit objects can be used among agents in an enduring relationship, that is, among agents with known trading histories, whereas the currency-like object must be used among relative strangers. In this environment, collectively determined Pareto-optimal rules make the level of the currency-like object and the mix of currency to named credits responsive to individual needs and to economy-wide states. Total indebtedness is determined by the number of lenders, that is, by preference or demand shocks, and the mix of currency to credits is determined by transaction patterns among the agents. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

私人信息经济货币信用帕累托最优规则