Two-dimensional fiscal competition
分析两个相邻国家在二维市场中的商品税竞争，发现小国税率更低但人均收入更高，且边界弯曲度加剧竞争压力，对税率和收入差异的影响与对比率的影响相反。
This paper analyses commodity tax competition between two neighboring countries whose governments are tax‐revenue maximizers in a two‐dimensional market. The results suggest three conclusions in a geographical sense. First, a small country sets a lower tax than does a big country, and per capita revenue of the small country is larger than that of the big country. Second, these two countries are subject to severer competitive pressure in the case of a more curved national border. Finally, the impact of border curvature on tax and revenue differences are always opposite in sign with the impact on tax and revenue ratios.