Strategic Errors and Audit Quality: An Experimental Investigation
通过一个经理与审计师的简单双矩阵博弈实验，发现增加完全诚实的审计师比例反而会提高审计报告质量，这与纳什均衡预测相反，但量化反应均衡能解释实验结果。
We report experimental results for a simple bimatrix game between a manager and an auditor. We investigate whether the quality of audited financial statements improves if the relative proportion of perfectly honest auditors increases. We find that the quality of audited reports is higher if computerized auditors who always perform a high audit effort are present. This result is in direct contrast to the Nash prediction for our game. The Quantal Response Equilibrium, which explicitly takes into account boundedly rational behavior, supports our experimental data. Our main findings depend neither on framing nor the payoff matrix we use.