Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices
比较了完全竞争行业中生产商争夺零售货架时，上架费与转售价格维持两种行为的均衡结果，发现转售价格维持虽劣于边际成本定价，但优于上架费均衡。
Producers in a perfectly competitive industry compete to obtain shelf space at the retail level. Barring contract observability problems, slotting allowances are observed in equilibrium. Producers charge a high wholesale price, but they give back their profits via up-front payments to retailers. However, if the individual supplier-retailer wholesale price terms are unobservable by competitors, then resale price maintenance will be seen, but the coverage will not be universal. The equilibria can be ranked by the usual social welfare criteria. Resale price maintenance, though worse than simple marginal cost wholesale pricing, yields greater surplus than the slotting allowance equilibrium.