Agency Contracts with Long‐Term Customer Relationships
研究销售代理合同中佣金和追回条款的经济逻辑，利用新西兰保险业数据验证银行进入后因客户筛选导致佣金和追回条款价值下降的预测。
In certain industries, sales agent contracts include provisions for sales commissions and clawbacks of commissions if clients are not retained. We show that contracts with these features arise in environments having up-front selling costs recouped from ongoing sales; heterogeneous customers; limited agent access to capital markets; and imperfect commitment to long-term contracts. We test the model using information on insurance sales agent contracts from New Zealand prior to and after bank entry into insurance sales. The evidence indicates that banks cream-skimmed customers. We predict that this should reduce the values of sales commissions and clawbacks. The data support this prediction.