Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard
研究多期道德风险问题，假设合同可重新谈判且代理人行动有长期影响，刻画了可实施多种行动（包括随机行动）的防重新谈判合同，并发现均衡中委托人可能实施随机行动，从而具有逆向选择模型的标准特征。
This paper studies a multiperiod moral hazard problem under two assumptions: (i) contracts are subject to renegotiations; (ii) the agent's action has long-term effects. The action is also interpreted as a choice of characteristic or "type." Renegotiation-proof contracts that implement various actions, including random ones, are characterized. Under appropriate conditions, the equilibrium involves the principal implementing a random action. Therefore, the equilibrium has standard properties of "adverse selection" models.