Caution and Conservatism in the Making of Monetary Policy
重新审视了将货币政策委托给谨慎且保守的央行行长的好处，指出谨慎能提高可信度但无法替代保守主义，并推导出最优的保守主义概念以缓解可信度问题，从而解释为何可信的货币政策有助于稳定通胀和产出。
Does society benefit from the delegation of monetary policy to cautious and conservative central bankers? We offer a critical view on the delegation literature and relax seemingly innocuous assumptions about uncertainty and preferences. First, caution improves credibility but does not obviate the need for central-bank conservatism. Second, previous models of delegation have focused on suboptimal forms of conservatism. We derive optimal concepts of conservatism that mitigate, or eliminate, any residual problem of credibility. Third, we rationalize why credible monetary policy may be conducive to stable inflation and output.