The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors
研究接管后目标公司董事的离职和董事会席位变化，发现目标公司业绩好时董事会更换比例更低，董事声誉（如兼任多个董事席位）能降低离职率并增加未来席位，但维护股东利益的行为并未带来更多席位。
Abstract: This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post‐takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex‐post settling‐up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats.