Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?
分析1984-1991年间792家美国上市公司CEO股票期权授予情况，发现代理理论和财务契约理论对期权授予模式的解释力很弱，与现有研究结论一致。
This paper analyzes stock option wards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options’ performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests examine whether the mix of compensations between stock options and cash pay can be explained by corporate liquidity, tax status, or earnings management. Results indicate that few agency or financial contracting theories have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards, a finding in accord with others’ conclusions that CEO pay arrangements do not reflect well the normative predictions of compensation theorists.