Asymmetric Entrant Locaiton with a Discrete Consumer Distribution: Spatial Price Discrimination Versus Mill Pricing
研究了在消费者离散分布（如五个等距城镇）且企业实行空间价格歧视时，进入者的利润最大化选址。发现当需求完全无弹性时，进入者在对称位置和连续非对称位置间无差异；但需求向下倾斜时，进入者严格偏好两个非对称位置之一，这与出厂定价模型的结果截然不同。
In this paper I examine the profit‐maximizing locations of entrants. Suppose that firms practice spatial price discrimination and consumer locations are discrete, such as five equally spaced towns on a roadway. With completely inelastic consumer demand an entrant between two existing firms is often indifferent between the symmetric (central) location and a continuum of asymmetric (noncentral) locations. However, downward‐sloping consumer demand often causes the entrant to strictly prefer either of two asymmetric locations to any other location. These results are very different from those found in mill‐pricing (free‐on‐board or f.o.b.‐pricing) models.