The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict
研究了在不完全信息冲突博弈中，极端分子通过公开信息操纵双方决策的条件：当行动为战略互补时，鹰派极端分子增加冲突概率并降低福利；当行动为战略替代时，鸽派极端分子则改变双方行为。
Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An “extremist,” who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements).