Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment
比较了密封投标统一价格拍卖（国库券实验形式）与密封投标歧视性拍卖（此前形式），假设物品完全可分。研究表明，基于单单位需求的拍卖理论不适用于国库券，统一价格拍卖中合谋策略可自我执行，导致卖方预期收入低于歧视性拍卖。
We compare a sealed-bid uniform-price auction (the Treasury's experimental format) with a sealed-bid discriminatory auction (the Treasury's format heretofore), assuming the good is perfectly divisible. We show that the auction theory that prompted the experiment, which assumes single-unit demands, does not adequately describe the bidding game for Treasury securities. Collusive strategies are self-enforcing in uniform-price divisible-good auctions. In these equilibria, the seller's expected revenue is lower than in equilibria of discriminatory auctions.