Takeover Motives during the Conglomerate Merger Wave
研究1960年代末联合企业并购浪潮中股市对收购公告的反应，发现收购方股东从多元化收购中获益，且市场偏好保留目标公司管理层的收购，不支持管理层自利动机或盈利操纵假说。
This article examines the stock market response to acquisition announcements during and immediately after the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s. The main finding is that acquirer shareholders benefited from diversification acquisitions, which implies that diversification was not driven by managerial objectives. It is also shown that the market responded positively to bidders who retained the management of target companies and negatively to bidders who replaced target management. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the market favored acquisitions intended to exploit managerial synergies. It suggests that the market disliked takeovers that were motivated to discipline target management. Evidence on buyer and target price-earnings ratios is presented that is inconsistent with the conjecture that conglomerates were able to mislead investors by earnings-per-share manipulation.