The Central Banker as a Risk Manager: Estimating the Federal Reserve's Preferences under Greenspan
推导了泰勒规则的自然推广，将利率变动与可持续增长和物价稳定的双重目标所隐含的风险平衡联系起来，并检验了格林斯潘时期美联储的决策更符合风险权衡而非简单响应通胀和产出缺口的条件均值。
We derive a natural generalization of the Taylor rule that links changes in the interest rate to the balance of the risks implied by the dual objective of sustainable economic growth and price stability. This monetary policy rule reconciles economic models of expected utility maximization with the risk management approach to central banking. Within this framework, we formally test and reject the standard assumption of quadratic and symmetric preferences in inflation and output that underlies the derivation of the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that Fed policy decisions under Greenspan were better described in terms of the Fed weighing upside and downside risks to their objectives rather than simply responding to the conditional mean of inflation and of the output gap.