Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
研究垄断卖家在缓慢学习自身产品质量时，声誉如何影响其生存。若卖家与顾客同步学习，糟糕运气可能使其停止销售；若卖家已知质量，好卖家永不退出，坏卖家在低声誉时可能退出。
We consider the impact of reputation on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows her quality, a good seller never stops selling though at low reputations a bad seller does with some probability. Furthermore, a seller with positive, though imperfect, information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public. We further consider the robustness of the central result when the seller's opportunities for strategic behaviour are limited. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.