Rights versus Underwritten Offerings: An Asymmetric Information Approach
假设投资者与寻求新股权融资的企业之间存在信息不对称，推导出一个理性预期、部分揭示信息的均衡，解释了为何高质量企业采用备用配股、中等质量企业通过未保险配股的选择来传递信号，而低质量企业则选择成本更高的承销发行。
ABSTRACT By assuming asymmetric information between investors and firms seeking new equity, we derive a rational expectations, partially revealing information equilibrium in which three forms of equity financing are observed. The highest quality firms employ a standby rights offers, intermediate quality firms signal their true value in the choice of a subscription price in an uninsured rights offer, while low‐quality firms remain indistinguishable to investors by making fully underwritten issues. The model offers justification for many firms using apparently more costly underwritten offers, provides a reason why firms using uninsured rights offers do not set arbitrarily low subscription prices to ensure the success of the issue, and explains the simultaneous existence of the three financing vehicles.