Trade and Insurance with Adverse Selection
研究一个包含安全部门和风险部门的小型开放经济，其中个体在风险活动中的成功概率不同且为私人信息，证明维持信息约束帕累托最优的政策不应包括关税，且自由放任竞争均衡若存在则是帕累托最优，这与先前假设私人风险市场不存在的关税保险文献形成对比。
This paper considers a small open economy with a safe sector and a risky sector. The probability of success in the risky activity differs across individuals, and is private information. It is shown that policies that sustain informationally constrained Pareto optima should not include tariffs. A laissez-faire competitive equilibrium, if it exists, is Pareto optimal. These results contrast with previous literature on the role of tariffs as insurance, where private risk markets are assumed away in an ad hoc manner.