Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly Information
扩展了阿克洛夫、萨洛普和斯蒂格利茨的研究，考虑卖方同时选择价格与质量、买方付费获取个别卖方信息的情形，发现均衡中价格与质量组合多样，并比较了允许价格广告时的福利效果。
This paper extends the seminal work of Akerlof, and Salop and Stiglitz in two directions: (i) the sellers can select both the selling prices and quality levels of their good, and (ii) the buyers can acquire price/quality information about individual sellers at a cost. We observe multiple price/quality combinations in equilibrium, which depend upon the distribution of information costs of consumers and upon whether quality, or price, or both are costly observable. Welfare comparisons of equilibrium are considered. We show that welfare will be greater when price advertising is permitted.