Why do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and Acquisitions
利用银行特定数据估计竞争风险模型，发现管理效率低下增加倒闭风险、降低被收购概率，而接近资不抵债的银行更可能被收购。
This paper seeks to identify the characteristics that make individual U.S. banks more likely to fail or be acquired. We use bank-specific information to estimate competing-risks hazard models with time-varying covariates. We use alternative measures of productive efficiency to proxy management quality, and find that inefficiency increases the risk of failure while reducing the probability of a bank's being acquired. Finally, we show that the closer to insolvency a bank is (as reflected by a low equity-to-assets ratio) the more likely is its acquisition. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology