SPATIAL PRICE COMPETITION WITH CONSUIMERS ON A PLANE, AT INTERSECTIONS, AND ALONG MAIN ROADWAYS*
研究了平面上主干道网格中的二维价格竞争，分析了消费者均匀分布、沿主干道线性集中和交叉路口点集中三种情形下的伯特兰-纳什工厂定价与价格歧视均衡。
ABSTRACT. This paper examines two‐dimensional price competition on a plane, with a block metric and a square grid of main roadways. One store is located at each intersection of main roadways. Consumer locations include a uniform distribution over the plane, linear concentrations along main roadways, and point concentrations at intersections. Bertrmd‐Nash mill price competition is examined first. The equilibrium price depends on the relative numbers of consumers in the three types of locations (and on travel costs per mile and the spacing between stores). If too many consumers are in each point concentration, then the price equilibrium is undermined by a high‐price strategy or by mill‐price undercutting. Spatial competition with price discrimination is examined next, and compared to Bertrand‐Nash mill price competition.