A Sex Difference in Risk Taking and Promotions in Hierarchies: Evidence from Females in Legislatures
研究验证了Scotchmer模型的两个推论：赢者通吃的晋升机制更偏爱风险承担倾向的男性，但晋升的女性能力更强；通过跨国立法机构性别构成和美国议员连任数据提供了实证支持。
Scotchmer showed how a sex difference in risk taking can cause promotional patterns to differ across sexes, even if discrimination is absent and ability is identically distributed ex ante. In her model, (1) winner-take-all promotions favor risk-taking males, but (2) promoted females enjoy greater ability and (3) see this advantage depreciate with repeated play. I find persistent evidence for the first two implications in how the sex composition of national legislatures differs across electoral mechanisms (winner-take-all chambers employ a greater proportion of males) and in how reelection prospects for U.S. representatives differ by sex (females enjoy longer expected service in a winner-take-all chamber). Finally, while the data convey less information about the third implication, the results are difficult to rationalize in alternative models and can have important implications not only for affirmative action doctrines but also for corporate fiduciary duties.