Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation
证明，在管理者关心声誉且能力信息不对称的简单环境中，多数管理者可能放弃随机优于行业标准的创新，因为采用行业标准的管理者会因更准确的业绩基准而被评估，而薪酬在低业绩时的非连续性导致不同能力类型的管理者对准确基准的估值不同，高能力和低能力管理者比中等能力者更可能采用优越创新。
This paper demonstrates that, in a simple setting with managerial concern for reputation and asymmetric information on ability, most managers may refrain from undertaking innovations that stochastically dominate an industry standard. Common components of uncertainty lead to market inferences of managerial ability based on relative performance. Managers who undertake the industry standard are consequently evaluated with a more accurate benchmark than those innovating. Discontinuities in compensation when performance is low lead managers to have differing valuations of an accurate benchmark, depending on type. In particular, very high and very low ability managers are more likely to undertake superior innovations than those of average ability. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.