A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship
通过实验室市场实验，检验责任规则和长期合同两种制度能否缓解代理关系中的道德风险问题，对研究委托代理理论和制度设计的学者有参考价值。
Recent developments in agency theory have focused on the moral hazard problem in single-period and multiperiod models. In particular, the literature has emphasized how alternative institutions (e.g., liability rules and long-term contracts) can mitigate the adverse effects of the moral hazard problem. In this study, we use laboratory markets to examine the ability of two such institutions to remedy the adverse effects of moral hazard. We begin by presenting one set of markets with no liability rule from DeJong, Forsythe, and Lundholm [1985], hereafter DFL, where the effects of moral hazard were examined in a market for a service with a hidden characteristic; that is, the principal could not distinguish between shirking and chance as causes of an unfavorable outcome.1 The study showed that moral hazard led to shirking, and while