Why does capital structure choice vary with macroeconomic conditions?
构建了一个校准模型，解释为何公开上市公司的杠杆呈现显著逆周期特征，并将其与债务和股权发行联系起来。模型还解释了为何面临更严重融资约束的公司不呈现此特征。
This paper develops a calibrated model that explains the pronounced counter-cyclical leverage patterns observed for firms that access public capital markets, and relates these patters to debt and equity issues.\nMoreover, it explains why leverage and debt issues do not exhibit this pronounced behavior for firms that face more severe constraints when accessing capital markets. In the model, managers issue a combination of\ndebt and equity to finance investment by weighing the trade-off between agency problems and risk sharing. During contractions, leveraged managers receive a relatively small share of wealth, resulting in a relative increase in household demand for securities. Securities markets clear as managers that are not up against their borrowing constraints increase leverage while satisfying the agency condition that they maintain a large enough portion of their firm’s equity.