Special Interest Politics.
本书系统分析了民主国家中特殊利益集团如何通过竞选捐款和信息提供影响公共政策，解释了政策结果为何常偏离经济学规范建议，适合关注政治经济互动的研究者。
Why are observed policy outcomes so different from many of the normative prescriptions of economic theory? The new book by Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman is the end result of an almost decade‐long research programme into the mechanisms by which special interest groups affect public policy in democracies. Their first article was on trade protection, Grossman and Helpman (1994), but the authors quickly recognised that the principles underlying interest group activity in trade policy could easily be used as a starting point of a more general model of special interest politics. The book is far more than a thinly disguised collection of papers: It is a unified, synthetic treatment of special interest politics, incorporating not only the authors’ own approach – centred around campaign contribution models based on models of common agency – but also models where interest groups provide information, rather than funds, to actors in the policy process. Indeed, references to their own work are rarely given, and only when other co‐authors took part.