Vertical Restraints with Incomplete Information
研究了当零售商拥有私人信息时，纵向约束（如特许权费合同和转售价格维持）如何影响效率，发现转售价格维持在需求信息不对称时可实现最优，但成本信息不对称时仍存在扭曲。
When a firm contracts with a privately informed retailer, vertical restraints may be insufficient to eliminate distortions arising from having to induce truthful reporting. With franchise fee contracts (which are equivalent to any other "quantity forcing" contract), two distortions arise. The first is the need to transfer surplus to the retailer and the second is a reduction in the marginal return to production. With retail price maintenance contracts, the "first best" outcome of vertical integration is obtainable if the retailer observes private information only about the state of demand. If the retailer observes also private information about retailing costs, both distortions persist. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.