Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
研究了当个体对备选方案有二分偏好时，计分规则下诚实报告偏好的激励问题，发现博达计数与批准投票等价，且是唯一防策略操纵的计分规则。
In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule, and (c) if the size of the electorate is greater than three, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.