Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked
研究无限可分商品在单峰偏好下的公平分配，发现满足一致性的有效无嫉妒解都包含均匀规则，并基于一致性的逆和个体理性刻画了均匀规则。
We consider the problem of fairly allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. We search for methods of performing this division, or solutions, that satisfy the following property of consistency: any recommendation made for any economy is in agreement with the recommendation made for any "reduced" economy obtained by imagining the departure of some of the agents with their allotted consumptions. Our main result is that essentially all efficient subsolutions of the no-envy solution satisfying consistency must contain a certain solution known as the uniform rule. We also characterize the uniform rule on the basis of a "converse" of consistency and the distributional requirement of individual rationality from equal division. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D71.