SPATIAL MONOPSONY AND MONOPOLY PRICING IN A STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT*
研究了面临随机供给或需求曲线的空间买方垄断者或卖方垄断者的行为，证明在不确定性下价格设定与数量设定不等价，并比较了空间价格歧视与数量歧视的预期利润。
ABSTRACT. In this paper some of the important properties of the behavior of a spatial monopsonist (monopolist) facing a stochastic supply (demand) curve are derived. Under uncertainty, price setting and quantity setting behavior are no longer equivalent. Hence, spatial price discrimination has to be compared with spatial quantity discrimination with respect to expected profits. I prove three general theorems on how the ranking of the behavioral modes, in terms of expected profit, depends on how the stochastic component enters the supply (demand) and supply (demand) price functions. In particular, I prove that under monopsony one would expect a high probability of excess demand, in the sense that the firm would accept all deliveries at the preset price.