Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets
研究银行为何自愿向信用登记机构提供部分优质借款人信息，发现这能加剧未披露借款人的逆向选择问题，从而限制新银行进入并减少其竞争规模。
In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries. A recent World Bank survey reveals that the display of a lender's own borrower information is often not reciprocated. That is, access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data. We argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons. The reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem. This prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent's profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry. Copyright 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006.