FOLK THEOREMS FOR INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY ORGANIZATIONS WITH SHORT‐LIVED MEMBERS*
研究由短期成员组成的组织进行无限重复博弈，成员无记忆且通过私人信息传递实现合作，证明民间定理成立，对理解组织内合作机制有用。
We consider infinitely repeated games played by organizations with short‐lived members. Each member enters the organization with no prior memory. He plays the role of taking actions for stage games in the first half of his lifetime. In the beginning of the second half, when a new member enters the organization, the existing member privately sends a message to the new member. He remains in the organization for the second half, and then retires from the game. We prove that folk theorems hold in this environment; that is, organizations essentially implement Fudenberg and Maskin strategies.