The Winner's Curse and Bidder Competition in Acquisitions: Evidence from Failed Bank Auctions
利用FDIC密封投标拍卖数据，检验竞标者竞争是否导致失败银行收购方支付过高价格（赢家诅咒），发现竞标人数增加会推高所有竞标者的出价，但仅看赢家出价时结果需谨慎解读。
ABSTRACT This study examines the effect of bidder competition in acquisitions. We use predictions from auction theory to test whether acquirers of failed banks overpay (the “winner's curse”) when bidding in FDIC sealed‐bid purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions (auctions). The empirical results indicate that winning bids tend to increase as the number of competitors increases, as predicted by theory. We also find that bid levels of all bidders increase with increased competition, which is consistent with bidders' failing to adjust for the winner's curse in a common value auction setting. However, additional tests using winning bids only are consistent with both a common value and a private values model, so this result should be interpreted with caution.