Shareholder Heterogeneity, Adverse Selection, and Payout Policy
当股东出售股票的计划不同时，他们对公司用现金分红还是回购股票有不同的偏好。本文建立模型，说明经理人利用信息优势进行股票回购时存在逆向选择成本，并发现公司用应税分红传递质量信号，好公司分红更低而更多使用回购。
When shareholders have different plans to sell their shares, they will, in general, have different preferences concerning the firm's decision to pay out cash using dividends or share repurchase. We illustrate these different preferences and explore a model of payout policy that highlights the adverse selection costs of repurchases when managers have superior information about the value of the firm. We show that, in the absence of fixed costs to repurchasing shares, there is a separating equilibrium in which managers use taxable dividends to signal the quality of the firm, with better firms paying lower dividends, using repurchases for the remainder of the payout. With fixed costs to repurchasing, small payouts are made via dividend and large payouts are divided between repurchases and dividends, as in the no-fixed cost case. In both cases, the percentage of shares repurchased increases with the size of the payout and larger repurchases are better news.