Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals
构建动态资本估值模型，研究养殖场为规避动物地方病而采取不同成本的行为，发现多重均衡存在且社会最优均衡对应最大行动者集合，并分析了资本市场、官僚体制、技术创新和赔偿方案对疾病防控与社会福利的影响。
The article develops a dynamic capital valuation model in which farms can act with farm‐varying cost to increase the probability of avoiding an infectious endemic animal disease. Multiple endemic disease equilibria can exist, and the one with the largest set of action takers is socially optimal. Costly capital markets are shown to be a factor in determining the extent of disease. Frictions, such as dealing with a veterinary public health bureaucracy, can enhance social welfare by encouraging precautionary biosecurity actions. Technical innovations can reduce social welfare, and a disease indemnification scheme is also studied. Suggestions for empirical implementation are provided.