ANARCHY AND AUTARKY: ENDOGENOUS PREDATION AS A BARRIER TO TRADE*
构建了一个两国家李嘉图贸易模型，其中个体将劳动分配于生产和掠夺，产生内生交易成本。在没有风险分担和防御协调制度时，大部分参数下经济处于自给自足；当贸易和掠夺同时存在时，贸易条件效应可能使安全措施反而降低福利，甚至掠夺反而创造贸易。
This article presents a general equilibrium two‐country Ricardian trade model with endogenous transactions costs that arise from individual utility‐maximizing allocation of labor to production and piracy. In the absence of institutions for risk sharing and coordination of defense, autarky obtains over most of the parameter space. When both trade and predation are supported in equilibrium, terms of trade effects can make security immiserizing. In that case, paradoxically, predation creates trade.