The Dissipation of Profits by Brand Name Investment and Entry When Price Guarantees Quality
构建了一个同时考虑品牌投资和厂商进入两种利润耗散渠道的模型，发现两者通常并存，且品牌投资对消费者反应的弹性越大，其耗散的利润份额越高。
Two previous models of the dissipation of profits generated by the use of quality-guaranteeing prices assumed that pro fits were dissipated through investment in brand-name capital and ent ry. The model of this paper allows both possibilities. It is shown th at both types of dissipation will, in general, occur and that brand-n ame investment will dissipate a greater share of profits as the elast icity of consumer response to brand-name investment grows larger. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.