DECENTRALIZED TAX COMPETITION FOR BUSINESS CAPITAL AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY*
研究由独立区域组成的国家中，地方为吸引商业投资而进行的税收竞争如何影响经济效率，发现原子式区域当局只对本地资源征税以提供公共服务，从而产生有效均衡，但政治或制度约束会导致资本错配和公共服务低效。
ABSTRACT For a nation composed of independent regions, the effects of local tax competition for business investments are examined. It is first shown that atomistic regional authorities tax only local resources to finance the provision of public services to business. Thus, an efficient interregional equilibrium is induced. Various political/institutional constraints are shown to cause misallocation of the capital stock and an inefficient provision of public services. The characterization of the inefficiency is shown to vary widely, depending upon the constraint under consideration.