Competitive Lending with Partial Knowledge of Loan Repayment: Some Positive and Normative Analysis
研究了放贷方在不完全了解还款情况时如何依据不同标准做决策，并分析了公共部门通过调整安全资产回报率或担保最低贷款回报来最大化社会借贷收益的政策效果。
We study a credit market where lenders with partial knowledge of repayment use one of several criteria to make lending decisions. Supposing that a public Authority wants to maximize the social return to borrowing, we study interventions that manipulate the return on the safe asset or guarantee a minimum loan return. Manipulating the return on the safe asset is effective if lender beliefs about the return to lending are not too pessimistic relative to those of the Authority. Guaranteeing a minimum return is effective if lender beliefs are not too optimistic relative to those of the Authority.