Strategic Alliances, Shared Facilities, and Entry Deterrence
研究一种常见的战略联盟（如航空业共享产能）的反竞争效应：在位企业通过邀请潜在进入者共享现有设施，阻止其自建新设施，从而减少竞争并可能降低社会福利。
We explore some possible anticompetitive effects of one particular type of strategic alliance--common in the airline industry, among others--that involves the sharing of production capacity. An offer to share an existing facility can allow an incumbent to persuade a potential entrant not to build its own facility. We establish conditions under which an agreement to share will be anticompetitive in the sense that, absent the agreement, a more competitive outcome (i.e., entry with new capacity) would have obtained. Such alliances can reduce welfare even if the incumbent and entrant will not be direct competitors.