Directors' Pay and Turnover: An Application to a Sample of Large UK Firms
利用英国大型企业面板数据，检验董事薪酬与业绩正相关、CEO更替与盈利负相关的代理理论预测，发现薪酬与业绩和规模正相关，CEO更替与股东回报负相关，董事会治理因素在CEO继任中作用有限。
This paper examines the operation of the UK managerial labour market. We test the twin agency predictions that directors' pay is positively related to corporate performance and CEO turnover is negatively associated with firm profitability. We find that (i) the panel data econometric evidence reveals a significant and positive correlation between directors' pay, company performance and size, (ii) the CEO turnover model predicts a negative, and significant, association with pre‐dated shareholder returns: the data is consistent with the view that CEOs are disciplined by the threat of dismissal, (iii) boardroom governance factors (e.g. proportion of non‐executives and board size) are only of some importance in the CEO succession process.