The Federal Reserve as a Bureaucracy: An Examination of Expense-Preference Behavior
将美联储视为官僚机构，研究其费用偏好行为，发现美联储及其地区银行存在超出利润最大化点的费用增加倾向，且货币权力集中加剧了该行为。
In this paper, the Federal Reserve System is viewed as a bureaucracy with a bureau's incentive to increase expenses beyond the profit maximizing point. Moreover, the bureau consists of divisions, the district banks, that exhibit their own expense-prefer ence behavior. An empirical investigation of labor demand by the Boar d and district banks reported in this paper demonstrates that the Fed eral Reserve has engaged in expense-preference behavior and that the centralization of the monetary authority amplified this type of behav ior. Copyright 1988 by Ohio State University Press.