National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic
构建了一个投资中的敲竹杠模型，发现积极的产业政策在促进投资的同时也助长了腐败，而腐败会削弱投资效果。基于跨国证据，产业政策对投资的总效果仅为直接效果的56%至84%，表明腐败应纳入产业政策的成本收益分析。
We present a hold‐up model of investment where active industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Since corruption deters investment, the effect of industrial policy on investment is lower than when corruption is absent. We find evidence suggesting that corruption is indeed higher in countries pursuing active industrial policies. Policy implications are illustrated by decomposing the total effect of industrial policy into a positive, direct effect, and a negative, corruption‐induced effect. In the presence of corruption, the total effect of industrial policy on investment ranges between 84 and 56% of the direct impact. The magnitude of these corrections suggests that corruption considerations should not be absent from cost‐benefit analyses of industrial policies.