Aid Conditionality and Military Expenditure Reduction in Developing Countries: Models of Asymmetric Information
分析在非对称信息下，将军费削减等非经济条件纳入外援赠予时的问题，构建了两个委托代理模型分别对应多边和双边援助谈判，涉及逆向选择和双重道德风险。
The paper analyses problems of implementing non-economic conditionality, such as military expenditure reduction, in the granting of foreign aid given the presence of asymmetric information. We present two conceptually separate principal-agent models, to capture the stylised facts of multilateral and bilateral aid negotiations respectively. The first model is an application of the problem of adverse selection when there is more than one type of principal (donor) with varying objectives. The second model extends moral hazard to double moral hazard, where neither principal nor agent (recipient) can fully observe or verify each other's strategies.