STACKELBERG GAMES ON A NETWORK WITH COURNOT‐NASH OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITORS
将空间斯塔克尔伯格-纳什-古诺竞争网络均衡问题建模为变分不等式约束的数学规划，通过敏感性分析算法求解，适用于研究寡头企业在网络中的生产与分销决策。
ABSTRACT. We formulate the spatial Stackelberg‐Nash‐Cournot competitive network equilibrium problem as a variational inequality constrained mathematical program. Our model differs from previous models of Stackelberg oligopolistic competition in that it employs explicit shipping decision variables and a general network topology. That is, the production and distribution decisions of the Stackelberg firm are determined simultaneously over a discrete network. We explore the existence of solutions to the proposed model, and we also numerically test a sensitivity analysis based algorithm. In particular, we illustrate how sensitivity analysis results can be used to generate the Cournot reaction necessary to solve the Stackelberg problem.