Tenure Decisions Under a Progressive Tax Structure
研究发现，联邦税法中针对租房者和自住者的补贴因家庭税级而异，低收入家庭租房补贴占优，高收入家庭自住补贴占优，且住房价值可能改变税级，导致税收异常现象。
Although certain provisions of the federal tax code provide subsidies to homeowners, others provide subsidies to renters in the form of tax incentives for investments in rental housing. We demonstrate that the renter subsidies dominate for households in low tax brackets whereas homeowner subsidies dominate for households in high tax brackets. Moreover the dollar magnitude involved in the tenure decision can easily push a household across tax brackets. Based on this relation, we identify an upper bound on the value of a dwelling that a household with a given income will prefer to own rather than rent for tax purposes. If the household were to choose a dwelling valued in excess of this household‐specific upper bound, the tax effect would reverse and favor renting. This complication provides a possible explanation for apparent tax anomalies in tenure decisions, i.e., high income renters and/or low income homeowners.