The Impact of In‐Substance Defeasance on Bondholder and Shareholder Wealth
检验了债务清偿交易是否导致财富从股东向债券持有人转移，发现债券持有人获利但股东损失不显著，可能与清偿债务规模相对较小有关。
ABSTRACT This paper hypothesizes and tests the argument that a defeasance transaction initiates a wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders. Our empirical tests provide compelling evidence of bondholder gains, but no support for shareholder losses when a firm defeases debt. We speculate that the insignificance of the loss to shareholders is primarily due to the size disparity between the value of defeased debt and the market value of outstanding equity, since the suggested economic merits of defeasance appear unfounded. Although we cannot prove an agency motivation for defeasance, we find a very high correlation between compensation tied to earnings and defeasing debt at a book gain.