通过“提高竞争对手成本”实现垄断:标准石油案

Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case

Journal of Law & Economics · 1996
被引 18
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了标准石油在1870年代通过卡特尔化运输环节(石油运输)来垄断石油行业,利用铁路公司排挤竞争对手,从而在精炼环节获得垄断和买方垄断定价权。

Abstract

Standard monopolized the petroleum industry during the 1870s by cartelizing the stage of production where entry was difficult--petroleum transportation. Standard enforced the transportation cartel by shifting its refinery shipments among railroads to stabilize individual railroad market shares at collusively agreed-on levels. This method of cartel policing was effective because Standard possessed a dominant share of refining, a dominance made possible with the assistance of the railroads. The railroads facilitated Standard's refinery acquisitions and prevented new refiner entry by charging disadvantageously high rates to non-Standard refiners. While Standard used its dominant position in refining to sell refined product at a monopoly price and to purchase crude oil at a monopsony price, Standard did not possess independent market power in refining. Whenever the transportation cartel broke down, Standard's pricing power vanished.

抬高竞争对手成本标准石油案运输卡特尔市场支配地位