Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs
分析了利益集团为争夺关税收入分配而进行的游说活动（收入寻求），发现即使对小国，这也可能减少进口品产量，但可能改善福利；租金寻求也可能改善福利。
The theory of commercial policy has recently addressed three phenomena: (i) tariff (quota) seeking or lobbying by potential beneficiaries for the imposition of a tariff (quota), (ii) tariff (quota) evasion, and (iii) rent seeking or lobbying for getting an allocation of the import quota to earn the rents generated. Revenue seeking or lobbying to secure a share in the disposition of the tariff revenues is analyzed here. it is shown that revenue seeking may, even for a small country, result in a reduction in importable output. Furthermore, revenue seeking may be welfare improving. Rent seeking may be welfare improving as well.