Unobservable CEO Characteristics and CEO Compensation as Correlated Determinants of CSP
研究了不可观测的CEO特征是否预测企业社会绩效，以及这些特征与CEO薪酬的相关性，发现CEO固定效应显著解释CSP差异，且与薪酬变量显著相关。
Do unobservable CEO characteristics predict corporate social performance (CSP) and are they significantly correlated with CEO compensation? How meaningful is stock-based CEO compensation as a predictor of CSP? To answer these questions, the author empirically examines the relationship between stock-based CEO compensation and CSP while accounting for unobservable CEO characteristics. This study finds that CEO fixed effects (CEO dummies) account for a significant variance in CSP and that these fixed effects are correlated with CEO compensation variables in a statistically significant manner. The findings suggest that unobservable CEO characteristics should be accounted for when examining the effect of CEO compensation variables on CSP. The findings also highlight the usefulness of stock-based compensation instruments for shareholders and other stakeholders who care about CSP and intend to promote CEO attention to social and ethical issues.